Terrorism Financing

The Dean of the Qatar University College of Law Provides a Perspective

On April 16, 2018, Dr. Mohammed A Al-Khulaifi, Dean of the QU College of Law, wrote an op-ed piece for the Qatar Tribune, one of the English-language papers published in Qatar.   Entitled Terror Financing: A Crime that Requires Global Responses, Dr. Al-Khulaifi argued that regulating terror financing required a two-front approach: (1) supervising charitable contributions, and (2) preventing financial crimes or other illegal economic activities.

He posed two questions: (1) What are the international standards that are designed to prevent and combat financing terrorism?, and (2) How does the State of Qatar comply with these standards?

He then outlines the international framework for combating terrorism financing, including the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937); the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005); the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism (1999).

This last convention requires states to criminalize terrorism-related offenses in their domestic laws.

UN Security Council Resolutions 2178 and 1373 also seek to regulate terrorism financing.

The Arab world has also embraced conventions to control terrorism financing, including the Arab Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism (1998) and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Combating International Terrorism (1999).

The UN's Global Counter Terrorism Strategy calls for five areas of focus: (1) dissuading disaffected groups from embracing terrorism; (2) denying groups or individuals the means to commit acts of terrorism; (3) making it difficult for states to support terrorist groups; (4) developing capabilities to defeat terrorism; and (5) defending human rights.

The editorial goes on to describe Qatar's compliance with international laws and standards.  For example, Qatar:

• Is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  I discuss the assessment of Qatar in the context of this task force here.
• Ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism (1999).
• Passed Law No. 3 of 2004 on Combating Terrorism, which the Emir updated by decree in 2017. 
• Founded the Authority for Charitable Activities to regulate the activities of charitable institutions.
• Established an Economic Crimes Combating Section at the Criminal Investigation Department of the Ministry of the Interior.
• Passed Law No. 4 of 2010 on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.
• Issued rules in 2010 to implement Law No. 4 of 2010 through the Qatar Financial Market Authority.
• Organized the seventh conference of the International Association of Police Academies to discuss trends in combating terrorism.
• Held the 23rd and 24th plenary meetings of the Middle East and North African Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF).
• Signed a MOU with the U.S. in July 2017 enhancing counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing.

The editorial ends by listing the nine recommendations of the FAFT:

• Implementing UN conventions and resolutions.
• Criminalizing terrorism and its financing.
• Confiscating the assets of terrorists.
• Reporting suspicious activities.
• Enhancing international cooperation.
• Monitoring money transfers.
• Scrutinizing wire transfers.
• Supervising non-profits that may serve as funnels for money intended for terrorism.
• Detecting cross-border transportation of money and negotiable instruments.

The Dean concludes by saying: "[O]ne should emphasize the importance of incorporating these nine recommendations in any governmental efforts to combat the crime of financing terrorism." 

Qatar's Efforts in Preventing Terrorism Funding

Let the Experts Speak on this Topic

From the beginning of the siege of Qatar, the blockading countries -- Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Bahrain, and Egypt -- anchored their narrative about Qatar in a way that arguably would trigger the passions of a Western audience. Qatar, they asserted, financed terrorists, sheltered terrorist leaders, and supported Islamic radical movements throughout the region.  Qatar, on the other hand, consistently denied these claims.  It also publicly condemned 2017-18 terrorist attacks in Qatif, Pakistan, Egypt, Manchester, Tehran, London, Bahrain, Somalia, Barcelona, Jeddah, Peshawar, Kabul, and Benghazi.

I am in the process of writing three articles about the siege of Qatar.  I spent the week-end closely examining these allegations.  I have found two reports worth reviewing: 

• Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, U.S. Dept. of State (July 2017), available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf; 
• Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism, Qatar, Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (April 9, 2008), available at file:///D:/Users/py15990/Downloads/Class%20Prep/Siege/2008%20MER%20Qatar.pdf. 

On July 19, 2017, the U.S. Department of State issued its annual Country Reports on Terrorism 2016.  U.S. law requires the department to provide Congress a complete report on terrorism for countries that meet certain criteria set out in the law.  The summary shows that Qatar equals or exceeds its neighbors in efforts in fighting terrorism.  On Qatar’s role in terror financing the report found:

Qatar is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and the Qatar Financial Information Unit is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Qatar has made significant progress on deficiencies identified in its MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation Report in 2008. According to the Second Biennial Update Report, Qatar is deemed “Compliant or Largely Compliant” with all but recommendation 26, which accounts for regulation and supervision of financial institutions.

* * *

The Government of Qatar has made progress on countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), but terrorist financiers within the country are still able to exploit Qatar’s informal financial system. In 2015 and 2016, Qatar prosecuted and convicted Qatari terrorist financiers for the first time. As part of ongoing reforms to curb terrorist financing, the State of Qatar issued the Cybercrime Prevention Law and the Law Regulating Charitable Activities in 2014. Qatar continued to be an active participant in U.S.-sponsored training and capacity building focused on CFT issues.

(Emphasis added.)  The report also discusses progress in the blockading countries and recognizes that each one faces unique challenges when trying to prevent money-laundering, eliminate funding for terrorism, and reduce the support for violent Islamist groups. While the report got very little attention in the press of Qatar or the West, it does support a narrative that Qatar has responded to the stated interest of its blockading neighbors. 

The second report allows a reader to analyze the extent of the efforts taken since 2008 by Qatar to meet the stated goals of eliminating terrorism in the world. It seems to serve as a baseline assessment.   Similar reports exist for the blockading countries.  

I will watch closely for the 2017 report that the U.S. Department of State will publish in July 2018.  So much has happened during that year.  I wonder how the department will analyze it.