Karmic Payback? Saudi Football Fans May Miss Their Team's World Cup Opening Match

One Way the Blockade Effects 

People and not Just Governments

I am writing several book chapters for an upcoming book on the blockade of Qatar. In one chapter I described attacks on the media by the countries starting the blockade – Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain, and Egypt. Among other things, the countries blocked Al Jazeera broadcasts and other media originating from Qatar.

I stated that the media blockade serve at least two purposes. It keeps an opposing narrative about Qatar from reaching people in the blockading countries. It also limits access to programming popular with conservative Muslim audiences.

In that chapter, I also described the Saudis relationship with sport broadcaster beIn Sports:

Saudi Arabia also blocked access to the ubiquitous and highly popular, Qatar-financed, beIN Sports on June 13, 2018. The station has about 5,000 staffers working in 43 countries. The U.A.E blocked access for six weeks before restoring it on July 22, 2018. Police had ejected and questioned beIN reporters attending sports events in the blockading countries or required them to remove company logos from equipment. The blockading countries would not allow marketing of the company or the sale of subscriptions, and they have encouraged their athletes to boycott any interviews with beIN. Countries sympathetic to the siege have prevented beIN staff from entering their countries to cover events. A pirate station also began working in Saudi Arabia. Then in January 2018, Egypt’s top prosecutor indicted beIN’s CEO, Nassar Al-Khelaifi, on charges of monopolistic practices.

See Paula Marie Young, "Power-Based Interventions of Countries Organizing the Siege Against Qatar," Qatar: Political, Economic, and Social Issues (Nova Science Pubs. expected 2019).

In what some people would characterized as Karmic payback, the Gulf Times reported on June 9, 2018 that negotiations between beIN and Saudi Arabia have broken down. beIN owns the rights to broadcast all 64 games of the World Cup. The £25 million sub-licensing deal would allow the broadcast in Saudi Arabia of the opening and closing match plus 20 other games of the World Cup.

The 21st World Cup begins on June 14, 2018 in Russia. If the negotiation fails, Saudi fans will have to watch the games through pirated broadcasts at locations with that broadcast capability. They will not be able to watch, from the comfort of their homes, their own team play in the opening match with Russia.

beIN has reached a sub-licensing deal with the U.A.E.

The Saudis have now asked FIFA to negotiate the deal on their behalf.  Its football federation later filed a complaint with FIFA. For more on this aspect of the story see here and here.

Saudi Arabia said it would broadcast the matches illegally, which triggered a response from FIFA and beIn Sports.

FIFA later imposed a hefty fine on Egypt's football team because Egyptian players refused to give beIn interviews.

Clearly, the blockading countries did not anticipate that the blockade would extend into this important football tournament. They erroneously expected Qatar to capitulate quickly to the demands of the blockading countries. Instead, Qatar creatively responded to the siege. See Paula Marie Young, "The Siege of Qatar: Creating a BATNA that Strengthened the Tiny Country’s Negotiating Power," Qatar: Political, Economic, and Social Issues (Nova Science Pubs. expected 2019).

Update: On June 13, 2018, Qatari officials announced that they had created three fan zones in different terminals of Qatar's international airport that would allow travelers to watch World Cup matches in their entirety.

The 12th Al Jazeera Forum: Session 1 - The Gulf Crisis

The Gulf, the Arabs, and the World 
Amid Current Developments


On April 28-29, 2018, Al Jazeera held its 12th Forum providing an opportunity for leading scholars and other experts to discuss a variety of topics affecting the Arab world.  The website for the forum, @aljazeeraform, provides additional information and links to the videos of each session.  You can follow the Twitter coverage at #AJForum.

As I noted in my first post in this series, I am working from my notes, so I apologize in advance if I incorrectly paraphrase the remarks of any speaker. I was also reliant on the quality of the translation services and their audibility. Therefore, I am happy to make any needed edits to this summary.

For summaries of the other sessions see:

• Opening Session
• Session 2: Iran and the Gulf
• Session 3: Change in the Region?
• Session 4: Changing Alliances in the Arab World
• Session 5: Palestine and the "Deal of the Century"
• Session 6: The Media During Times of Crisis
• Session 7: Where is the Gulf Headed?

Session 1: A year since the start of the Gulf crisis: outcomes and potential courses.

Session focus:

Nearly a year has passed since the start of the Gulf crisis on 5 June 2017 with a land, sea and air blockade on Qatar initiated by a media campaign executed by the besieging countries. Despite Kuwait’s concentrated diplomatic efforts and the support of regional and international positions, the crisis still faces a standstill, continues to drain inter-Gulf relations and lowers the capital of the Arab Gulf both regionally and globally. The crisis between the Arab Gulf countries has affected the whole regional situation and has resulted in the formation of alignments and alliances of differing objectives and opposite agendas. It has created new power relations that will be difficult to surpass in the near future. The objective of this session is to review the outcomes of the Gulf Crisis and forecast developments in light of efforts to resolve it and the challenges hindering these efforts.

Speakers:

• Majad Al Ansari, Professor of Political Sociology at Qatar University and Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI)
• Abdulla Al Ghalani, Professor of Social Sciences at Oman Medical College
• Faisal Abu Sulaib, Associate Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University
• Cinzia Bianco, Senior Analyst at Gulf State Analytics
• Mohamed Si Bachi, Professor of Political Science at the L'Ecole Nationale Superieure de Sciences Poltiques 

Key Points:

Prof. Al Ansari:  The blockade has shifted from a surprising event to a nearly year-long stalemate.  It has shown that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) cannot resolve a dispute, whether regional or international in affect.  With the GCC facing its "biggest crisis ever," people are predicting its disintegration.  The speaker predicts its survival, recognizing that it has served as the "hope of the people of the region." 

The Gulf is increasingly affected by the greater participation of France, Russia, and Africa.  

The region should be able to survive the Gulf crisis.  It is more stable compared to the MENA region and Africa.  It has handled significant crises since the 1970s, including the Iraqi war, the Kuwait invasion, the Yemeni war, and regional regime changes.

The blockade is not an isolated crisis, but ties back to historical tensions created by state borders created in the 1970s.  It reflects a conflict over political and economic resources.

The speaker noted that when Saudi Arabia is stronger, other GCC countries become weaker.  He referred to 1996, 1999, and 2003 as periods illustrating this dynamic.  In contrast, when Saudi Arabia is weaker, GCC countries gain strength.  

He acknowledged the success of the Kuwaiti mediator in avoiding a military invasion of Qatar.

The blockade created an opportunity Iran did not anticipate, for Iran to play a bigger role in the region.  The blockade focuses enmity within the GCC, rather than against Iran.

It could end if:

• The GCC countries agree to its end, or
• An economic recession forces resolution.  
• It may affect the ability to attract foreign capital to the region. 

Prof. Faisal Abu Sulaib:  Sadly, no popular pressure can be exerted on the decision-makers involved in the siege.  Ending the siege is a personal decision of the King of Saudi Arabia. 

Two international variables are in play.  First, the Trump administration aligned with Saudi Arabia early in the siege.  Second, Saudi Arabia and UAE have used an effective lobbying effort designed to influence US policy in the region.

The blockading countries have not achieved their 13 demands with the siege.  They were never real demands.  Instead, the main objective of the blockading states was to change Qatari foreign policy by fostering a palace coup.

But, Qatar did not change its foreign policy to align with Saudi Arabia and UAE, especially as to Yemen.  However, Qatar has not had the ability to focus on foreign policy when its leaders have had to cope with the country's national security.

The blockading countries did not foster a palace coup.  Instead, Qatar showed more leadership stability, financial stability, and a more cohesive populace.  Saudi Arabia quickly abandoned this effort in the face of these facts.

The blockading countries have also failed at isolating Qatar, either regionally or internationally. It has moved the country closer to Iran.

The blockade has created new balances of power and alliances.  The four blockading countries are aligned against Turkey-Iran-Qatar.  At the same time, the US, France, and Britain aligned in agreeing to the strike in Syria following the use of chemical weapons by the Asad regime.

The "deep rift" created by the siege will not be closed easily or quickly.  The GCC is showing vulnerability with the new committee formed by Saudi Arabia and UAE.

Saudi Arabia and UAE played an increasing role in the GCC after the Arab Spring at the expense of smaller Gulf states.

If Qatar successfully resolves the blockade, it will offer a model for other small countries in the region and world-wide, like Luxembourg, Singapore, and South Korea.

Potential outcomes include:

• Escalation, either with military invasion or a media war.  
• The threatened water canal between Saudi Arabia and Qatar could aid Qatar's defense.
• Stagnation and stalemate with GCC becoming a symbolic entity with little influence, like the Arab Maghreb Union.
• Resolution of the dispute.  The Trump administration seeks a resolution because of its interests in Syria. 

Prof. Abdulla Al Ghailani:  The thirteen demands were never convincing.  The crisis has deeper roots including the coup attempt in 1996 [against Father Emir Hamad] and the hegemonic ambitions of Saudi Arabia.

The blockading countries sought to undermine Qatar's sovereignty by targeting its soft power.

After 2011, Saudi Arabia's ambitions created a broader regional crisis. It seeks to maintain an authoritarian rule, which was threatened by the demands of the protesters during the Arab Spring. 

If Saudi Arabia experiences success in the Yemen war, the Qatar crisis could go unresolved.  However, if Saudi Arabia experiences setbacks there, then the Qatari blockade could end.

What are the results after nearly a year after the onset of the blockade?

• US is extorting investments and expenditures from Gulf countries because the region is weaker and more exposed to international influence.
• It has cast a shadow over the political reforms in the GCC.  
• Kuwait and Oman are making progress, but retreated from their efforts after the onset of the crisis.  
• The blockading countries have justified more authoritarian actions because "we are in crisis."  
• They are preventing dissenting points of views. 
• Created a psyche of fear and panic in Oman and Kuwait.  People there feared the use of a military option in the Gulf.  These small countries could be the next targets of Saudi Arabia's hegemonic ambitions.
• Created a schism in the populace of the region.
• Exposed the Gulf regimes as barbaric and ready to use a blockade, coup, or military intervention to achieve their goals.
• Exposed the inability of the GCC to handle conflicts.  It was not designed for that purpose. 
• Qatar and other GCC countries have had to go to international forums for resolution of prior issues.

Future paths:

• Military intervention to subjugate Qatar.  Not likely give US desires and the neutrality of Kuwait and Oman.
• Fragile political agreements with the possibility of a later explosion of the crisis.
• Most likely:  Gradual attrition or stalemate.  This situation could affect Qatar long term and force it to respond partially to some demands.
• Not likely to see a change by Saudi Arabia, UAE, or Bahrain.
• Could be impacted by outcome of 2020 US elections.
• Kuwait and Oman stated neutrality, but can exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and UAE.
• Saudi Arabia and UAE could expand their hegemony to Kuwait and Oman. 

Also in the mix is how the Yemen, Libya, and Syrian conflicts affect the Gulf crisis?

Cinzia Bianco:  The European Union views this crisis as negative and "not helpful."

The EU:

• Considers nuclear deal with Iran important and worries that Trump is putting it under remarkable stress, with encouragement from Saudi Arabia.
• Is concerned about the fragmentation of the region, especially in Africa, Yemen, and Syria.
• Views US as less trustworthy.
• Is confused about the US commitment to the geopolitical balance in the region.
• Is impacted more than the US by events in the Arab world.

The EU was created to enhance economic and social cooperation and ties to help prevent violent conflicts among European states.

• The Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC) focused on enhanced economic cooperation, but did not prevent the Qatari crisis. 
• Viewed by the EU as a blow to its own strategy.

The UK:

• is dependent on the Gulf for 30 percent of its gas supply [check this].
• Qatar, in turn, is a big investor in UK real estate and infrastructure.
• Accordingly, the UK is in a difficult position.  It can not take the lead in resolution of the dispute.  It can not be seen as taking sides. 
• In addition, the UK is focused on BREXIT.

France:

• Maintains a strong relationship with all GCC countries.
• President Macron has tried to "rebalance" the relationship.
• But, he has no real capacity to force an end to the siege.

The EU may be forced to play a more active role if Saudi Arabia and the UAE try to impose their will on Kuwait and Oman.

Prof. Mohamed Si Bachir:  Third speaker to highlight how the blockade extended beyond diplomatic relations and government actors to the people of the Gulf, especially Qataris.

Several speakers, including this speaker, mentioned the "Iranian project" and the "Turkish project,"  which seem to refer to more aggressive foreign policies that extend the geopolitical influence of these countries.

This speaker expressed concerns that Gulf states had failed to build robust states and to create a social contract bringing dignity to the peoples of the region.  Instead, they created strategic partnerships with stronger countries from outside the region. These partnerships, however, are not necessarily helpful to the Arab world. 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pressured Oman and Kuwait for a harmonious regional policy.  Oman and Kuwait responded by declaring their neutrality in the dispute.  Both countries are closer to the policy of Qatar given their own national security reasons.  

Qatar's Efforts in Preventing Terrorism Funding

Let the Experts Speak on this Topic

From the beginning of the siege of Qatar, the blockading countries -- Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Bahrain, and Egypt -- anchored their narrative about Qatar in a way that arguably would trigger the passions of a Western audience. Qatar, they asserted, financed terrorists, sheltered terrorist leaders, and supported Islamic radical movements throughout the region.  Qatar, on the other hand, consistently denied these claims.  It also publicly condemned 2017-18 terrorist attacks in Qatif, Pakistan, Egypt, Manchester, Tehran, London, Bahrain, Somalia, Barcelona, Jeddah, Peshawar, Kabul, and Benghazi.

I am in the process of writing three articles about the siege of Qatar.  I spent the week-end closely examining these allegations.  I have found two reports worth reviewing: 

• Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, U.S. Dept. of State (July 2017), available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf; 
• Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism, Qatar, Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (April 9, 2008), available at file:///D:/Users/py15990/Downloads/Class%20Prep/Siege/2008%20MER%20Qatar.pdf. 

On July 19, 2017, the U.S. Department of State issued its annual Country Reports on Terrorism 2016.  U.S. law requires the department to provide Congress a complete report on terrorism for countries that meet certain criteria set out in the law.  The summary shows that Qatar equals or exceeds its neighbors in efforts in fighting terrorism.  On Qatar’s role in terror financing the report found:

Qatar is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and the Qatar Financial Information Unit is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Qatar has made significant progress on deficiencies identified in its MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation Report in 2008. According to the Second Biennial Update Report, Qatar is deemed “Compliant or Largely Compliant” with all but recommendation 26, which accounts for regulation and supervision of financial institutions.

* * *

The Government of Qatar has made progress on countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), but terrorist financiers within the country are still able to exploit Qatar’s informal financial system. In 2015 and 2016, Qatar prosecuted and convicted Qatari terrorist financiers for the first time. As part of ongoing reforms to curb terrorist financing, the State of Qatar issued the Cybercrime Prevention Law and the Law Regulating Charitable Activities in 2014. Qatar continued to be an active participant in U.S.-sponsored training and capacity building focused on CFT issues.

(Emphasis added.)  The report also discusses progress in the blockading countries and recognizes that each one faces unique challenges when trying to prevent money-laundering, eliminate funding for terrorism, and reduce the support for violent Islamist groups. While the report got very little attention in the press of Qatar or the West, it does support a narrative that Qatar has responded to the stated interest of its blockading neighbors. 

The second report allows a reader to analyze the extent of the efforts taken since 2008 by Qatar to meet the stated goals of eliminating terrorism in the world. It seems to serve as a baseline assessment.   Similar reports exist for the blockading countries.  

I will watch closely for the 2017 report that the U.S. Department of State will publish in July 2018.  So much has happened during that year.  I wonder how the department will analyze it. 

Trump Can Solve Qatar Blockade with a Phone Call

Ending the Siege of Qatar

At a Heritage Foundation event on January 29, 2017, Qatari Minister of State for Defense Khalid bin Mohammad al-Attiyah declared: “The only person who can solve the GCC issue is President Trump . . . . He can solve it in a phone call.”

U.S.-Qatari Military-to-Military Relations, The Heritage Foundation (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/us-qatari-military-military-relations (statement at about 43 minutes in audio recording).

Based on my research, I agree.  I am in the process of writing an article entitled:  

"The Siege of Qatar: Applying Dispute Resolution System Design Theory to Actions Taken by the Disputing Parties in the First Nine Months of the Siege."  I will let you know when it is published.  Anyone wanting a copy of the manuscript should send me an email.

Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights in Qatar

Blockade Called "Arbitrary":

No Evidence of Any "Legal Decisions" Motivating Measures Taken by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt

In December, 2017, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, issued a very important report that got no coverage by Western press.  You can find the report here.

I am quoting the Findings and Observation at the end of the report in full.  I have added the emphasis.

IV. Findings and observations
 
59. All Interlocutors met by the team mostly referred to the decision of 5 June as a  “blockade”, and some evoked an “embargo”, a “boycott” or “unilateral sanctions” against the State of Qatar and its inhabitants (nationals and residents). Most emphasized the unprecedented divide and distrust this situation has generated, not least given the tight family  bonds across the Gulf region. They also expressed concern about the uncertain and far-reaching consequences, with fears that this crisis may become protracted and/or deteriorate.

60. The team found that the unilateral measures, consisting of severe restrictions of  movement, termination and disruption of trade, financial and investment flows, as well as suspension of social and cultural exchanges imposed on the State of Qatar, had immediately translated into actions applying to nationals and residents of Qatar, including citizens of KSA, UAE and Bahrain. Many of these measures have a potentially durable effect on the enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of those affected. As there is no evidence of any legal decisions motivating these various measures, and due to the lack of any legal recourse for most individuals concerned, these measures can be considered as arbitrary. These actions were exacerbated by various and widespread forms of media defamation and campaigns hated against Qatar, its leadership and people.

61. The majority of the measures were broad and non-targeted, making no distinction between the Government of Qatar and its population. In that sense, they constitute core elements of the definition of unilateral coercive measures as proposed by the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee: “the use of economic, trade or other measures taken by a State, group of States or international organizations acting autonomously to compel a change of policy of another State or to pressure individuals, groups or entities in targeted States to 15 influence a course of action without the authorization of the Security Council”. Moreover, measures targeting individuals on the basis of their Qatari nationality or their links with Qatar can be qualified as non-disproportionate and discriminatory.

62. The considerable economic impact of the crisis takes over the dimension of an economic warfare, with significant financial losses for the State, companies and individuals, and the confidence of investors being eroded. To date, the wealth of Qatar and its human potential have allowed the country to promptly absorb the shock and protect the population from potentially disastrous economic and social consequences. However, the shock of the decision and the immediate and serious effect of unilateral coercive measures on many individuals have had a major psychological impact on the overall population. This has been exacerbated by a hostile media campaign that flared up from early June and is ongoing. All interlocutors met by the team evoked the lack of trust or even fear this situation has generated, and concerns about the social fabric of very closely-knit societies eroding.

63. In some cases, Qatari institutions, notably the NHRC, have proactively sought prompt solutions, especially for individuals whose studies were interrupted. The NHRC immediately, and for several weeks following 5 June, received a considerably number of complaints. They undertook a series of communications with regional and international mechanisms and have  endeavoured to engage with the national human rights institutions of KSA, UAE, Bahrain (to no avail to date) and Egypt (the latter has reportedly cooperated). The team received a detailed report prepared by the National Compensation Claims Commission on the impact of the crisis on individuals (including on human rights impact), and was informed that the National Compensation Claims Commission had hired a private American law firm company to look at options for potential legal actions against the States of KSA, UAE and Bahrain. The commission indicated that the legal file was in the hands of the Government for its consideration. 

64. The majority of cases remain unresolved and are likely to durably affect the victims, particularly those having experienced family separation, loss of employment or who have been barred from access to their assets. 

65. The crisis has been characterized by the absence of dialogue among the States concerned, with the mediation efforts initiated by Kuwait having stalled. The team noted strong resentment about the lack of action by regional organizations and about the role of the GCC, which many considered as de facto defunct. Given the origins and ramifications of the crisis in KSA, UAE and Bahrain, it would be critical to pursue opportunities to engage with the Governments of these countries to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the situation, notably of the actions they have taken and the impact on their own citizens and residents.