Karmic Payback? Saudi Football Fans May Miss Their Team's World Cup Opening Match

One Way the Blockade Effects 

People and not Just Governments

I am writing several book chapters for an upcoming book on the blockade of Qatar. In one chapter I described attacks on the media by the countries starting the blockade – Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain, and Egypt. Among other things, the countries blocked Al Jazeera broadcasts and other media originating from Qatar.

I stated that the media blockade serve at least two purposes. It keeps an opposing narrative about Qatar from reaching people in the blockading countries. It also limits access to programming popular with conservative Muslim audiences.

In that chapter, I also described the Saudis relationship with sport broadcaster beIn Sports:

Saudi Arabia also blocked access to the ubiquitous and highly popular, Qatar-financed, beIN Sports on June 13, 2018. The station has about 5,000 staffers working in 43 countries. The U.A.E blocked access for six weeks before restoring it on July 22, 2018. Police had ejected and questioned beIN reporters attending sports events in the blockading countries or required them to remove company logos from equipment. The blockading countries would not allow marketing of the company or the sale of subscriptions, and they have encouraged their athletes to boycott any interviews with beIN. Countries sympathetic to the siege have prevented beIN staff from entering their countries to cover events. A pirate station also began working in Saudi Arabia. Then in January 2018, Egypt’s top prosecutor indicted beIN’s CEO, Nassar Al-Khelaifi, on charges of monopolistic practices.

See Paula Marie Young, "Power-Based Interventions of Countries Organizing the Siege Against Qatar," Qatar: Political, Economic, and Social Issues (Nova Science Pubs. expected 2019).

In what some people would characterized as Karmic payback, the Gulf Times reported on June 9, 2018 that negotiations between beIN and Saudi Arabia have broken down. beIN owns the rights to broadcast all 64 games of the World Cup. The £25 million sub-licensing deal would allow the broadcast in Saudi Arabia of the opening and closing match plus 20 other games of the World Cup.

The 21st World Cup begins on June 14, 2018 in Russia. If the negotiation fails, Saudi fans will have to watch the games through pirated broadcasts at locations with that broadcast capability. They will not be able to watch, from the comfort of their homes, their own team play in the opening match with Russia.

beIN has reached a sub-licensing deal with the U.A.E.

The Saudis have now asked FIFA to negotiate the deal on their behalf.  Its football federation later filed a complaint with FIFA. For more on this aspect of the story see here and here.

Saudi Arabia said it would broadcast the matches illegally, which triggered a response from FIFA and beIn Sports.

FIFA later imposed a hefty fine on Egypt's football team because Egyptian players refused to give beIn interviews.

Clearly, the blockading countries did not anticipate that the blockade would extend into this important football tournament. They erroneously expected Qatar to capitulate quickly to the demands of the blockading countries. Instead, Qatar creatively responded to the siege. See Paula Marie Young, "The Siege of Qatar: Creating a BATNA that Strengthened the Tiny Country’s Negotiating Power," Qatar: Political, Economic, and Social Issues (Nova Science Pubs. expected 2019).

Update: On June 13, 2018, Qatari officials announced that they had created three fan zones in different terminals of Qatar's international airport that would allow travelers to watch World Cup matches in their entirety.

Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights in Qatar

Blockade Called "Arbitrary":

No Evidence of Any "Legal Decisions" Motivating Measures Taken by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt

In December, 2017, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, issued a very important report that got no coverage by Western press.  You can find the report here.

I am quoting the Findings and Observation at the end of the report in full.  I have added the emphasis.

IV. Findings and observations
 
59. All Interlocutors met by the team mostly referred to the decision of 5 June as a  “blockade”, and some evoked an “embargo”, a “boycott” or “unilateral sanctions” against the State of Qatar and its inhabitants (nationals and residents). Most emphasized the unprecedented divide and distrust this situation has generated, not least given the tight family  bonds across the Gulf region. They also expressed concern about the uncertain and far-reaching consequences, with fears that this crisis may become protracted and/or deteriorate.

60. The team found that the unilateral measures, consisting of severe restrictions of  movement, termination and disruption of trade, financial and investment flows, as well as suspension of social and cultural exchanges imposed on the State of Qatar, had immediately translated into actions applying to nationals and residents of Qatar, including citizens of KSA, UAE and Bahrain. Many of these measures have a potentially durable effect on the enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of those affected. As there is no evidence of any legal decisions motivating these various measures, and due to the lack of any legal recourse for most individuals concerned, these measures can be considered as arbitrary. These actions were exacerbated by various and widespread forms of media defamation and campaigns hated against Qatar, its leadership and people.

61. The majority of the measures were broad and non-targeted, making no distinction between the Government of Qatar and its population. In that sense, they constitute core elements of the definition of unilateral coercive measures as proposed by the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee: “the use of economic, trade or other measures taken by a State, group of States or international organizations acting autonomously to compel a change of policy of another State or to pressure individuals, groups or entities in targeted States to 15 influence a course of action without the authorization of the Security Council”. Moreover, measures targeting individuals on the basis of their Qatari nationality or their links with Qatar can be qualified as non-disproportionate and discriminatory.

62. The considerable economic impact of the crisis takes over the dimension of an economic warfare, with significant financial losses for the State, companies and individuals, and the confidence of investors being eroded. To date, the wealth of Qatar and its human potential have allowed the country to promptly absorb the shock and protect the population from potentially disastrous economic and social consequences. However, the shock of the decision and the immediate and serious effect of unilateral coercive measures on many individuals have had a major psychological impact on the overall population. This has been exacerbated by a hostile media campaign that flared up from early June and is ongoing. All interlocutors met by the team evoked the lack of trust or even fear this situation has generated, and concerns about the social fabric of very closely-knit societies eroding.

63. In some cases, Qatari institutions, notably the NHRC, have proactively sought prompt solutions, especially for individuals whose studies were interrupted. The NHRC immediately, and for several weeks following 5 June, received a considerably number of complaints. They undertook a series of communications with regional and international mechanisms and have  endeavoured to engage with the national human rights institutions of KSA, UAE, Bahrain (to no avail to date) and Egypt (the latter has reportedly cooperated). The team received a detailed report prepared by the National Compensation Claims Commission on the impact of the crisis on individuals (including on human rights impact), and was informed that the National Compensation Claims Commission had hired a private American law firm company to look at options for potential legal actions against the States of KSA, UAE and Bahrain. The commission indicated that the legal file was in the hands of the Government for its consideration. 

64. The majority of cases remain unresolved and are likely to durably affect the victims, particularly those having experienced family separation, loss of employment or who have been barred from access to their assets. 

65. The crisis has been characterized by the absence of dialogue among the States concerned, with the mediation efforts initiated by Kuwait having stalled. The team noted strong resentment about the lack of action by regional organizations and about the role of the GCC, which many considered as de facto defunct. Given the origins and ramifications of the crisis in KSA, UAE and Bahrain, it would be critical to pursue opportunities to engage with the Governments of these countries to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the situation, notably of the actions they have taken and the impact on their own citizens and residents.