Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Al Jazeera. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Al Jazeera. Mostrar todas as mensagens

domingo, 10 de junho de 2018

Karmic Payback? Saudi Football Fans May Miss Their Team's World Cup Opening Match





One Way the Blockade Effects 
People and not Just Governments



I am writing several book chapters for an upcoming book on the blockade of Qatar. In one chapter I described attacks on the media by the countries starting the blockade – Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Bahrain, and Egypt. Among other things, the countries blocked Al Jazeera broadcasts and other media originating from Qatar.

I stated that the media blockade serve at least two purposes. It keeps an opposing narrative about Qatar from reaching people in the blockading countries. It also limits access to programming popular with conservative Muslim audiences.

In that chapter, I also described the Saudis relationship with sport broadcaster beIn Sports:
Saudi Arabia also blocked access to the ubiquitous and highly popular, Qatar-financed, beIN Sports on June 13, 2018. The station has about 5,000 staffers working in 43 countries. The U.A.E blocked access for six weeks before restoring it on July 22, 2018. Police had ejected and questioned beIN reporters attending sports events in the blockading countries or required them to remove company logos from equipment. The blockading countries would not allow marketing of the company or the sale of subscriptions, and they have encouraged their athletes to boycott any interviews with beIN. Countries sympathetic to the siege have prevented beIN staff from entering their countries to cover events. A pirate station also began working in Saudi Arabia. Then in January 2018, Egypt’s top prosecutor indicted beIN’s CEO, Nassar Al-Khelaifi, on charges of monopolistic practices.
See Paula Marie Young, "Power-Based Interventions of Countries Organizing the Siege Against Qatar," Qatar: Political, Economic, and Social Issues (Nova Science Pubs. expected 2019).

In what some people would characterized as Karmic payback, the Gulf Times reported on June 9, 2018 that negotiations between beIN and Saudi Arabia have broken down. beIN owns the rights to broadcast all 64 games of the World Cup. The £25 million sub-licensing deal would allow the broadcast in Saudi Arabia of the opening and closing match plus 20 other games of the World Cup.

The 21st World Cup begins on June 14, 2018 in Russia. If the negotiation fails, Saudi fans will have to watch the games through pirated broadcasts at locations with that broadcast capability. They will not be able to watch, from the comfort of their homes, their own team play in the opening match with Russia.

beIN has reached a sub-licensing deal with the U.A.E.

The Saudis have now asked FIFA to negotiate the deal on their behalf.  Its football federation later filed a complaint with FIFA. For more on this aspect of the story see here and here.

Saudi Arabia said it would broadcast the matches illegally, which triggered a response from FIFA and beIn Sports.

FIFA later imposed a hefty fine on Egypt's football team because Egyptian players refused to give beIn interviews.

Clearly, the blockading countries did not anticipate that the blockade would extend into this important football tournament. They erroneously expected Qatar to capitulate quickly to the demands of the blockading countries. Instead, Qatar creatively responded to the siege. See Paula Marie Young, "The Siege of Qatar: Creating a BATNA that Strengthened the Tiny Country’s Negotiating Power," Qatar: Political, Economic, and Social Issues (Nova Science Pubs. expected 2019).

Update: On June 13, 2018, Qatari officials announced that they had created three fan zones in different terminals of Qatar's international airport that would allow travelers to watch World Cup matches in their entirety.

segunda-feira, 21 de maio de 2018

The 12th Al Jazeera Forum: Session 6 - The Media During Times of Crisis




Responsibility of Combatants: 
Don't Kill Journalists!

On April 28-29, 2018, Al Jazeera held its 12th Forum providing an opportunity for leading scholars and other experts to discuss a variety of topics affecting the Arab world.  The website for the forum, @aljazeeraform, provides additional information and links to the videos of each session.  You can follow the Twitter coverage at #AJForum.

As I noted in my first post in this series, I am working from my notes, so I apologize in advance if I incorrectly paraphrase the remarks of any speaker. I was also reliant on the quality of the translation services and their audibility. Therefore, I am happy to make any needed edits to this summary.

For summaries of the other sessions see:
Session 6: The Media During Times of Crisis and Transitional Stages

Session focus:

While the media covers crises, conflicts, and wars; narrates events and puts their developments and trajectories into frameworks; and relays the perspectives of parties involve[d] in them; it also sheds light on the human dimension.  This is the core of humanitarian work.

The politicization of media usually exacerbates crises and conflicts, especially if news fabrication is applied to create an artificial political situation that conflicts with reality in order to impact political positions, decisions, and courses.  This in turn threatens security, peace and stability, and negatively affects human conditions.

What are the key purposes of the media during crises, conflicts, and wars?  What are the relevant values that govern media and humanitarian work?

Speakers:

  • Yehia Ghanem, Managing Editor of Al-Ahram International and Supervisor of Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism Network (ARIJ).
  • Purnaka de Silva, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Democracy (ISSD) in Malta.
  • Elsadig Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrahim, President of the Sudanese Journalists General Union.
  • Abdulwaheed Odusile, President of the Federation of African Journalists (FAJ) and the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ).
  • John Yearwood, Director of the Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI) and President and CEO of Yearwood Media Group. 
Key points:

Yehia Ghanem:  Al Jazeera redefined media in the region.  Prior to 1996, all media was state controlled.  From 1996 to 2001, it redefined disasters to include natural and man-made.  Focused on the humanitarian aspects of the disasters.  From 2001 to 2007, it began expressing the feeling of the "world against us (Arabs)."  Began with the Afghanistan war.  Made its resources open to all parties.  Focused on the horrors experienced by the people with field work rather than news room work.  Focused on people away from the power centers. 


Western media depicted Arabs and Africans as people to fear.  But, Al Jazeera looked at the economic, political, and social experiences of people in these regions, while showing the role the West had in creating the situations there.

By having bureaus in these regions, it had more access to the evolving stories. 

Purnaka de Silva:  Media impacts policy-making.  Provides a voice for the voiceless.  Shows suffering and the victims of human rights crimes.

No political will exists to de-escalate and de-militarize in the region.  To humanize.  Absence of diplomacy in the Gulf dispute.  Would hope the GCC family could set aside the disputes.

Media becomes essential to settling these disputes.


Showed a map of the routes for human trafficking.  Spoke of his suspicions that the mafia has seized control of the immigration facilities in Sicily and may be using the vulnerability of the people to force organ donations.  Journalists noticed that immigrants were asked to take blood tests before arrival and that the organ transplant center nearby expanded in 2011. Too dangerous to do further investigation.

Elsadig Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrahim:  East Africa has been given a very dark media image.

Abdulwaheed Odusile:  [I apologize to this speaker and the prior speaker for losing my concentration and having few, if any notes, about their presentations.]

John Yearwood:  In conflict zones, certain responsibilities exist.

For combatants, the rules are:
  • Don't kill journalists!
  • Respect the Geneva Convention on press access.
  • Respect the role of journalists.
  • Don't make journalists afraid to cover a story (e.g. ISIS beheading of a journalist).
For journalists:
  • Don't choose sides.
  • Be fair and accurate.

For public:
  • Push media to report fairly and accurately.
  • When that is not happening, report the gap and demonstrate for better reporting.


quarta-feira, 16 de maio de 2018

12th Al Jazeera Forum: Session 4 - Changing Alliances in the Region



Where is the Middle East Heading?

On April 28-29, 2018, Al Jazeera held its 12th Forum providing an opportunity for leading scholars and other experts to discuss a variety of topics affecting the Arab world.  The website for the forum, @aljazeeraform, provides additional information and links to the videos of each session.  You can follow the Twitter coverage at #AJForum.

As I noted in my first post in this series, I am working from my notes, so I apologize in advance if I incorrectly paraphrase the remarks of any speaker. I was also reliant on the quality of the translation services and their audibility. Therefore, I am happy to make any needed edits to this summary.

For summaries of the other sessions see:
Session 4: The Middle East Amid Changing Regional and Global Alliances

Session focus:

The crises and conflicts that erupted during the past numbers of years -- with the Gulf crisis being the most recent -- cover almost the entire Middle East, creating a high level of political and strategic liquidity.  Accordingly, relations between the region's countries have witnessed great changes, thus reshaping the features of the general scene and forming regional and global alliances that will not settle on a final form in the near future.  Rapid changes rocking the Middle East hinder stability, increase sources of threat, and make current regional and global alliances temporary and fragile arrangements open to all options.  Where is the Middle East heading amid these transformations and changing alliances?

Speakers:

  • Abdullah Al Shayji, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Kuwait University.
  • Galip Dalay, Research Director at Al Sharq Forum and Senior Associate Fellow at Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.
  • Mohamad Hosam Hafez, Assistant Professor at the College of Law at Qatar University.
  • Elahe Kolaie, Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Central Eurasia Research Department Centre at the University of Tehran.
  • Leonid Issaev, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow. 
Key points:

Abdullah Al Shayji:  Even though 400 million Arabs exist, power does not reside in their hands.  They engage in little joint action.

America's retreat from the region during the Obama administration was very disappointing.  It allowed the increasing role of Russia.

A cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia started when the Saudi embassy was attacked in 2016.   [See here and here for more information. And, this video does a good job explaining the cold war and the proxy wars in the region.  It suggests this rivalry began much earlier than 2016.]  

Iran claims to control the capitals of four Arab countries. 

Some people hope that Salman's rise to King of Saudi Arabia, Trump's election, and the formation of a 40 country Arab union could be a new beginning for the region.  But, that hope was dashed when members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  turned on Qatar and imposed a blockade. 

Until recently, the GCC served as a model for Arab unity.  It served as a leader.  But that is no longer true and its diminished situation is "very painful" for Arabs.  

Turkey, Russia, and Iran, rather than Arabs, are controlling the future of Syria. 

Trump has made the situation more complex.  He is the first American president outside the political establishment.  He is "moody" and "transactional."  He creates a lot of concern among regional political leaders.


The US presence in the Gulf costs American taxpayers nothing.  But, Trump wants the region to pay more for its security.  

In comparison, Israel costs US taxpayers $3 billion [a year].  Moving the embassy to Jerusalem adds insult to injury.  

The US is now producing more oil than Saudi Arabia.  But, the world still needs stability in the Arab world.

It is not likely that North Korea will denuclearize.  Iran is watching.  Where is the nuclear deal heading?
  • US withdrawal from the deal could be the "best, worst option" because it does not cover ballistic missiles, geopolitical expansion, or Iran's support for terrorism.
  • Alarm bells should ring in the Arab world. War is possible. 

Turkey and Iran both have national ambitions that extend beyond their borders.  What about Arab ambitions?

A new Middle Eastern order may emerge, but Arabs will be weaker.  Many Arab countries are fragile or failed states not capable of delivering services to their people.  

Galip Dalay:

Speaker has seen a shift to discourse about "national security," but it covers a "regional or network security," too. 

Yet, this push creates regional insecurity because by imposing demands on a neighbor to bolster a country's security, the second country impinges on the sovereignty of the first country.

Who is a terrorist?
  • In some countries, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria, the term covers political opposition.  Thus, the war on terror is problematic.
Alliances driven by fear rather than a shared vision:
  • The authoritarian group: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, and US via Trump.
    • Drive for a new regional order because the Arab Spring created regime anxiety.
    • Political Islam is deemed an intolerable "other."
    • But, national security depends on US.
  • Iranian network:  Asad's Syria, Hezbollah, Iraqi government, and Houthi government.
    • More coherence.
    • More network security.
      • But creating more regional backlash with more instability.
  • Turkey & Qatar:
    • Supported Arab Spring.
    • Qatar must now focus on its own national security instead of its foreign policy.
Each group is exclusive of the other groups.  So, they create more instability with counter-responses.


They are all trying to maximize their own national security or network security.

The challenge is to turn network security into regional security.

Mohamad Hosam Hafez:  When the post-World War boundaries of Arab countries were drawn, the Arab people were not consulted.  These boundaries laid the seeds of conflict.  Most of the state boundaries are not validated by international law.

Challenges:
  • New way of dealing with existing countries.
  • Non-state actors.
Alliances between countries are fragile and prone to change.
  • Temporary understandings.
  • Not creating long-term alliances to serve joint interests.
  • Even though GCC was a promising model, current events undermining it to the point of breaking it up or marginalizing its role in the region. 
Democracy should support people and allow them an easier way to change leaders.  But, post-Arab Spring, we saw governments blocking the actions of the people seeking change.  Cannot ignore people's desires.  They were political actors, despite counter-revolution. 

Even alliances in Syria seem short-term with Russia exploiting resources of oil and phosphate. 

Non-state actors:  If a strong security alliance had existed in Syria, ISIS would not have found a weakness to enter.

Elahe Kolaie: Arms race has occurred in the Arab region.  It has become an important purchaser of weapons in the last decade. 

States in the region do not use soft power effectively through dialogue and direct interaction.  Enhancing diplomatic actions would benefit everyone.

Democratization is an important issue.  Could change the dynamics of power politics.


US policy deprives Iran of the mutual benefits of the the region through expanded relationships with neighboring countries on both Eastern and Western borders.  It could serve as a stabilizing force, but that has been a missed opportunity. 

Iran seeks a regional dialogue. 

Leonid Issaev: The region is undergoing a reconfiguration.  The previous order collapsed after the 2011 Arab Spring.

New rules of the game and security architectures exist.  Question is whether they are created within the region or by outside actors.

Regional actors need to create agenda for region.  Policy now is very personalized. States tend to solve problems in most radical ways.

Global actors are not that interested in solving the problems of the Middle East.  That's a problem.
  • See Yemen humanitarian crisis.  Just try to organize an event about it, and the room will be empty.
  • Russians are not interested in discussing Middle East problems unless they have a nexus with US policy or actions.

Instead, global actors will use Middle East conflicts to serve their own interests.

No focus exists on reconciliation or disarmament.

Russians achieved short-term gains for Syrian regime, but no long-term gains for Syrian people.

No one outside the region has any solution for the Middle East problems, and they cannot create order in the region. 

Q & A:

Mood now reflects Iran's move towards hegemony at the expense of Arabs.  Iran is playing a negative role in the region.  May put other countries at risk.

In the absence of political leadership and a robust civil society, who can solve problems of the region?

Summary: Disorder.  Iranian intervention. Turkey's ambition.

Iran quickly sent snipers and weapons into Syria.  Hard to see Iran's interventions in Syria as enhancing regional security.

In the middle of a big turmoil, can we produce a new generation of problem-solvers?  Probably not.  They are raised by expat maids, [over]use technology, and have no dreams or aspirations. [Ouch.]

US is trying to impose tough diplomacy in connection with the Iranian nuclear deal.  

Syria is now split in four zones:  American, Russian, Iranian, and Turkish.  Does this represent the new paradigm in the Middle East? 

The 12th Al Jazeera Forum: Session 3 - Change in the Region?

A New Arab Spring Fueled by Socio-Economic Factors?

On April 28-29, 2018, Al Jazeera held its 12th Forum providing an opportunity for leading scholars and other experts to discuss a variety of topics affecting the Arab world.  The website for the forum, @aljazeeraform, provides additional information and links to the videos of each session.  You can follow the Twitter coverage at #AJForum.

As I noted in my first post in this series, I am working from my notes, so I apologize in advance if I incorrectly paraphrase the remarks of any speaker. I was also reliant on the quality of the translation services and their audibility. Therefore, I am happy to make any needed edits to this summary.

For summaries of the other sessions see:
Session 3:  Will socio-economic difficulties in the Arab world explode into a new wave of change in the region?

Session focus:
More than eight years have passed since the beginning of the Arab Spring revolutions.  The main demands of these revolutions were employment, development, and social justice.  However, despite the rapid changes witnessed by the region during these past years, social, and economic conditions are worsening continuously with warnings of new waves of popular movements and protests.  This is also the case in countries in which the movement of change continued to develop, even if it did so at a rough pace, and countries experienced counter-revolutions in the form of military coups, the spread of chaos, and sectarian and tribal conflicts through repeated attempts to restore the status quo.  Even the countries that were not part of the first wave of revolutions seem to be prone to spontaneous social eruptions.  Is the region really advancing towards a new wave of change?  What are the political and geopolitical reflections of this wave of change, should it happen?
Speakers:
  • Mohamed Mahoub Haroon, Professor of Social Science at the University of Khartoum.
  • Hmoud Al-Olimat, Professor of Sociology at Qatar University.
  • Haoues Taguia, Researcher at Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.
  • Niccolo Rinaldi, Vice-President for the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and a member of the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade (INTA).
  • Hamed Abdelmajed, Visiting Professor of Political Science at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
Key points:

Mohamed Mahoub Haroon:  A number of factors contributes to instability in the region.
  • Urbanization:
    • Increased urban populations.
    • More cities.
    • Resulting in external migration when people can't find jobs.
  • Change in needs:
    • Country versus city.
  • Youthfulness:
    • See here for a discussion of the number of youth in the MENA region.  Fifty percent of the population is younger than 25 years old. 
    • Bulge in the number of younger people.
    • Links to other factors.
  • Retreat from isolation:
    • People are interacting with a wider world.
    • Creates higher expectations.
    • People want more political participation.
  • Markets:
    • Investors want stable situations.
    • Or, they invest in unstable situations.
In the Arab world, all these conditions will exist simultaneously yielding ongoing conflicts in the region.  People will continue to push for political, economic, and social transformation.

Hmoud Al-Olimat: People revolt for many reasons. The desire for dignity and social justice are two important reasons.


Revolt typically leads to a counter-revolt.  But, when people break the barrier of fear, they will continue to pursue their interests.  They are like "seeds."

Counter-revolt is typically worse and more harsh than the status quo ante.  Can ignite the next round of revolt.


The explosion in the youth population creates a need for jobs and a demand for social justice.

All the conditions exist for change in the Arab world.

High unemployment in the Arab region:

  • Engenders little hope for new entrants to the labor market.
  • Has created a "critical situation."
States should preoccupy their youthful populations with building their countries.

  • Otherwise, they will become radicalized.
Education is key. 

Taxes:
  • Born by poorer people. 

Haoues Taguia:

Two dynamics in play:

  • Needs of the population that must be met for education, jobs, housing, and medical care.
  • The state's inability to respond.
Push for change will increase:
  • About 358 million people in the Arab world.
  • Will increase to 468 million in ten years.
Youth expect a decent life.
  • 80 percent of wars happen where youth are 60 percent of the population.
  • Region is seeing 20-30 percent unemployment even for educated people.
    • 25 percent of those unemployed have advanced degrees.

If oil prices are less than $100/barrel, most Arab states cannot meet the needs of their people.

Arab countries have difficulty attracting business investment because they do not respect the needs of business people.
  • Look at how the Saudis used the Ritz Carlton as a prison.
The majority of Arab people do not trust their governments to deliver on their unfulfilled promises.


Speaker does not expect peaceful changes.  Is fear high enough to keep the peace?

Sectarian segregation makes it harder to create one opposition group.  Instead, we see more separatist groups along sectarian lines.


Seeing more intervention in the Arab region by other powers, including Russia and Iran.

Seeing a rise in populism in the US under Trump and in Europe.  Democracy is taking a second seat to security interests.  Western powers do not want to see another Arab Spring.  Too destabilizing for the region [and oil production].  Want stability even if it keeps authoritarian power in place.

Increase in regional violence points to:

  • The failure of the Arab Spring.
  • The efforts of ISIS.
Military, as governments, can not achieve economic development.  That is one reason they are eventually forced to turn over power.

People can't bear current situation.  Will get even more bleak in the future. 

But, few peaceful options for change exist.

Niccolo Rinaldi: No one predicted the Arab Spring or the war in Syria.  

Once change takes place, governments can halt it temporarily, but it can move forward again.  Change, however, can take time.

Reasons for social discontent exist given large youth population in MENA region.

States allocating very little money for research on the future.  Less than 2 percent in most countries.

No political space exists for change to take place easily.
  • Access to political arena is difficult.
  • Judicial power is limited.  Cannot assist change with law, orders, and fairness. 
So people create a space in the roads and on social media.

The EU is impressed by:
  • Youth who did not oppose older people, but protested with them.
  • Cross-border learning among protesters.
Opposition can reactivate quickly even if currently dispersed.


Need inclusive citizenship and rational policy.  Need institutionalized trust and optimism.


Hamed Abdelmajed: Economic and social factors are not enough to create change.  Political and institutional failures created conditions for the Arab Spring.  But, even these failures may not lead to revolutionary change.

The UN list of human rights includes:

  • Education
  • Housing 
  • Food
Loss of human rights may be a better predictor of revolutionary change.

We need to be more humble about predicting change.

Status quo will prevail in the Arab world for some unpredictable time.
  • International players support authoritarian governments.
  • Regional alliances support authoritarian rule. 
  • Authoritarian leaders will fight any effort to change governing systems.
  • Institutional memory of harsh counter-revolutions exists.
Accordingly, these circumstances create a dangerous situation.  Will lead to failure of more Arab states.  They will see more economic and social deterioration.  The military will not be able to control it.

Change could come if:
  • Military or security institutions are weakened in a state.
  • New tools for revolution evolve (social media or something else).
  • Groups with an established leadership coalesce away from authorities . 
President Obama supported the Libyan revolution expecting democracy to produce friends in the region.  But then, the rebels killed the US diplomats at Benghazi.

Public support exists for the Arab Spring, but political elite are more cautious because they were friends with the people overthrown.

The West wants to avoid the consequences of these conflicts:
  • Refugees.
  • Instability in the region.
  • Terrorist attacks.
At the same time, speaker does not agree that the West supported the counter-revolution. 


The 12th Al Jazeera Forum -- Session 2: Iran and the Gulf



Iran and the Gulf: Between Cooperation, Competition, and Confrontation

On April 28-29, 2018, Al Jazeera held its 12th Forum providing an opportunity for leading scholars and other experts to discuss a variety of topics affecting the Arab world.  The website for the forum, @aljazeeraform, provides additional information and links to the videos of each session.  You can follow the Twitter coverage at #AJForum.

As I noted in my first post in this series, I am working from my notes, so I apologize in advance if I incorrectly paraphrase the remarks of any speaker. I was also reliant on the quality of the translation services and their audibility. Therefore, I am happy to make any needed edits to this summary.

For summaries of the other sessions see:
Session 2: Iran and the Gulf Between Cooperation, Competition, and Confrontation.

Session focus
While Iran has surfaced as one of the main elements of the current Gulf Crisis, its relations with Arab Gulf countries were turbulent and dominated by mutual tension and suspicion rather than cooperation and common action for many decades.  Crisis in various parts of the Middle East have exposed the features of the tension, which has escalated at times to military conflict.  Due to the amount and scope of regional crises, the possibility of resolution is unforeseeable.  Troubled relations between Iran and its Arab neighbors will remain an essential factor of instability and a source of threat to the region's security, development, and prosperity.  Will it be possible for the hostile relations and power struggle to become friendly relations based on cooperation, coordination, and work toward common regional destiny? 
Background and context:

  • Trump administration policy on Iran:  here.

Speakers:
  • Kayhan Barzegar, Director of the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies (CMESS) in Tehran.
  • Abdullah Basil Hussein, Deputy Director of the Iraqi Center for Research and Strategic Studies in Amman.
  • Abdul Karim Aslami, Yemeni parliamentarian
  • Fatima Alsmadi, Senior Researcher at Al Jazeera Center for Studies and the Head of Iranian Studies.
  • Boris Zala, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. 
Key Points:

Kayhan Barzegar:  Iran does not have a political point of view, but instead, a geopolitical point of view. Region is bringing problems to Iran, which is responding to protect its national security.  
  • Presence of US military bases in the region are perceived threatening.
  • Also feel threatened by Israel.

No debate exists inside Iran about whether it should be involved regionally.  Debate may exist over how to be involved.  

Nuclear deal created expectation that US and other parties would quit meddling in Iran.
  • Expected it to lesson Western anxiety.
  • But, it has left Western powers with desire to change the deal.
Coercive diplomacy via sanctions won't work to change Iran's role in regional issues.

When Iran is strong in the region, Saudi Arabia is weaker. When regional states are stronger in the region, Iran is weaker.  Each country needs more internal stability and power.  Then, it will contribute to regional stability.  

Abdullah Basil Hussein:  The burden of history defines the relationship between Iran and Arabs.  They view each other as competitors, not cooperators.
  • Iraqi-Iran war is an example.
  • Persian dominance of the region is another.
Moreover, they are isolated from each other.
  • Arabs know little about the intellectual culture of Iran.
Why is little cooperation possible?  When moderates arise in Iran, you see agreements.

Iraq has no unity of decision-making and has distanced itself from the Qatari crisis.

If US pulls out of nuclear deal, following options are possible:
  • War
  • Status quo
  • Regional organization of Turkey, Iran, and GCC, but Iran must abandon its revolutionary expansion and relate to other countries as a "state."

Abdul Karim Aslami:  Saudi Arabia and UAE seek hegemony in the region, especially in Yemen.  Iran's national and religious interests are manifesting in Yemen.  Yemen has no interest in the conflict, but it serves as the battleground for the conflict between larger states in the region.

Persian kings sought Yemeni help in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) until Islam rose.  

Iran sought an opportunity to enter Yemen.  It was strategic, when Arabs' response was not. 

Saudi Arabia wants Yemen to be subservient to it.  

Yemen was not included as a member in the GCC, although it later participated in some committees. 

UAE wants military ports on the coast of Yemen.  Saudi Arabia wants passage for oil exports.  

In 2004, the Yemeni government accused Iran of supporting the Houthis.  Houthis executed a coup in 2011. Iran then provided them military, financial, and media support.  Saudi Arabia invaded in 2015.

Fatima Alsmadi: The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is geopolitical, not religious.  It existed before the Iranian revolution.  It was a confrontation over oil.


The biggest problem is one of distrust.  Requires proactive diplomacy that explores and supports common interests. Any possible solution rests on finding and satisfying those interests.

If Trump "destroys" the nuclear agreement:
  • The region will experience greater insecurity.
  • Iran will take action.
    • Could resume uranium enrichment.
    • Could walk away from the agreement with the other parties (minority view).
What does Iran want from the Gulf?  It knows what it wants and doesn't want.

Does the GCC know what it wants from Iran?  No.

From the US policy perspective: Iran can be more powerful than the Arabs, but it cannot be more powerful than Israel.  

Since 2009, Iran has seen convergence between the state and the supreme revolutionary power.

Boris Zala:  Speaking from a European perspective, the region is focused on geopolitical games. 
  • How do you get the players out of this dynamic?  Out of this vicious cycle?
The region always involves the US and its threat of war.

The EU is not a military power.  It was created to overcome the geopolitical games of European states.  In the past, France and Germany were the regional super powers, with other countries hosting proxy wars.  Religious competition between Protestants and Catholics also played a role.  Competition between conservatives and progressives played a role. 

The EU is skeptical the Arab region can find a solution to ongoing tensions.
  • Would need to subjugate individual rivalries to create peaceful cooperation.
  • States typically impose that peaceful cooperation by agreement or regulation, but a functioning state does not exist in Yemen, Libya, Syria, or Iraq. 

segunda-feira, 14 de maio de 2018

The 12th Al Jazeera Forum: Session 1 - The Gulf Crisis












The Gulf, the Arabs, and the World 
Amid Current Developments


On April 28-29, 2018, Al Jazeera held its 12th Forum providing an opportunity for leading scholars and other experts to discuss a variety of topics affecting the Arab world.  The website for the forum, @aljazeeraform, provides additional information and links to the videos of each session.  You can follow the Twitter coverage at #AJForum.

As I noted in my first post in this series, I am working from my notes, so I apologize in advance if I incorrectly paraphrase the remarks of any speaker. I was also reliant on the quality of the translation services and their audibility. Therefore, I am happy to make any needed edits to this summary.

For summaries of the other sessions see:
Session 1: A year since the start of the Gulf crisis: outcomes and potential courses.

Session focus:
Nearly a year has passed since the start of the Gulf crisis on 5 June 2017 with a land, sea and air blockade on Qatar initiated by a media campaign executed by the besieging countries. Despite Kuwait’s concentrated diplomatic efforts and the support of regional and international positions, the crisis still faces a standstill, continues to drain inter-Gulf relations and lowers the capital of the Arab Gulf both regionally and globally. The crisis between the Arab Gulf countries has affected the whole regional situation and has resulted in the formation of alignments and alliances of differing objectives and opposite agendas. It has created new power relations that will be difficult to surpass in the near future. The objective of this session is to review the outcomes of the Gulf Crisis and forecast developments in light of efforts to resolve it and the challenges hindering these efforts.
Speakers:

  • Majad Al Ansari, Professor of Political Sociology at Qatar University and Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI)
  • Abdulla Al Ghalani, Professor of Social Sciences at Oman Medical College
  • Faisal Abu Sulaib, Associate Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University
  • Cinzia Bianco, Senior Analyst at Gulf State Analytics
  • Mohamed Si Bachi, Professor of Political Science at the L'Ecole Nationale Superieure de Sciences Poltiques 
Key Points:

Prof. Al Ansari:  The blockade has shifted from a surprising event to a nearly year-long stalemate.  It has shown that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) cannot resolve a dispute, whether regional or international in affect.  With the GCC facing its "biggest crisis ever," people are predicting its disintegration.  The speaker predicts its survival, recognizing that it has served as the "hope of the people of the region." 

The Gulf is increasingly affected by the greater participation of France, Russia, and Africa.  

The region should be able to survive the Gulf crisis.  It is more stable compared to the MENA region and Africa.  It has handled significant crises since the 1970s, including the Iraqi war, the Kuwait invasion, the Yemeni war, and regional regime changes.

The blockade is not an isolated crisis, but ties back to historical tensions created by state borders created in the 1970s.  It reflects a conflict over political and economic resources.

The speaker noted that when Saudi Arabia is stronger, other GCC countries become weaker.  He referred to 1996, 1999, and 2003 as periods illustrating this dynamic.  In contrast, when Saudi Arabia is weaker, GCC countries gain strength.  

He acknowledged the success of the Kuwaiti mediator in avoiding a military invasion of Qatar.

The blockade created an opportunity Iran did not anticipate, for Iran to play a bigger role in the region.  The blockade focuses enmity within the GCC, rather than against Iran.

It could end if:
  • The GCC countries agree to its end, or
  • An economic recession forces resolution.  
    • It may affect the ability to attract foreign capital to the region. 
Prof. Faisal Abu Sulaib:  Sadly, no popular pressure can be exerted on the decision-makers involved in the siege.  Ending the siege is a personal decision of the King of Saudi Arabia. 

Two international variables are in play.  First, the Trump administration aligned with Saudi Arabia early in the siege.  Second, Saudi Arabia and UAE have used an effective lobbying effort designed to influence US policy in the region.

The blockading countries have not achieved their 13 demands with the siege.  They were never real demands.  Instead, the main objective of the blockading states was to change Qatari foreign policy by fostering a palace coup.

But, Qatar did not change its foreign policy to align with Saudi Arabia and UAE, especially as to Yemen.  However, Qatar has not had the ability to focus on foreign policy when its leaders have had to cope with the country's national security.

The blockading countries did not foster a palace coup.  Instead, Qatar showed more leadership stability, financial stability, and a more cohesive populace.  Saudi Arabia quickly abandoned this effort in the face of these facts.

The blockading countries have also failed at isolating Qatar, either regionally or internationally. It has moved the country closer to Iran.

The blockade has created new balances of power and alliances.  The four blockading countries are aligned against Turkey-Iran-Qatar.  At the same time, the US, France, and Britain aligned in agreeing to the strike in Syria following the use of chemical weapons by the Asad regime.

The "deep rift" created by the siege will not be closed easily or quickly.  The GCC is showing vulnerability with the new committee formed by Saudi Arabia and UAE.

Saudi Arabia and UAE played an increasing role in the GCC after the Arab Spring at the expense of smaller Gulf states.

If Qatar successfully resolves the blockade, it will offer a model for other small countries in the region and world-wide, like Luxembourg, Singapore, and South Korea.

Potential outcomes include:
  • Escalation, either with military invasion or a media war.  
    • The threatened water canal between Saudi Arabia and Qatar could aid Qatar's defense.
  • Stagnation and stalemate with GCC becoming a symbolic entity with little influence, like the Arab Maghreb Union.
  • Resolution of the dispute.  The Trump administration seeks a resolution because of its interests in Syria. 
Prof. Abdulla Al Ghailani:  The thirteen demands were never convincing.  The crisis has deeper roots including the coup attempt in 1996 [against Father Emir Hamad] and the hegemonic ambitions of Saudi Arabia.

The blockading countries sought to undermine Qatar's sovereignty by targeting its soft power.

After 2011, Saudi Arabia's ambitions created a broader regional crisis. It seeks to maintain an authoritarian rule, which was threatened by the demands of the protesters during the Arab Spring. 

If Saudi Arabia experiences success in the Yemen war, the Qatar crisis could go unresolved.  However, if Saudi Arabia experiences setbacks there, then the Qatari blockade could end.

What are the results after nearly a year after the onset of the blockade?
  • US is extorting investments and expenditures from Gulf countries because the region is weaker and more exposed to international influence.
  • It has cast a shadow over the political reforms in the GCC.  
    • Kuwait and Oman are making progress, but retreated from their efforts after the onset of the crisis.  
    • The blockading countries have justified more authoritarian actions because "we are in crisis."  
    • They are preventing dissenting points of views. 
  • Created a psyche of fear and panic in Oman and Kuwait.  People there feared the use of a military option in the Gulf.  These small countries could be the next targets of Saudi Arabia's hegemonic ambitions.
  • Created a schism in the populace of the region.
  • Exposed the Gulf regimes as barbaric and ready to use a blockade, coup, or military intervention to achieve their goals.
  • Exposed the inability of the GCC to handle conflicts.  It was not designed for that purpose. 
    • Qatar and other GCC countries have had to go to international forums for resolution of prior issues.
Future paths:
  • Military intervention to subjugate Qatar.  Not likely give US desires and the neutrality of Kuwait and Oman.
  • Fragile political agreements with the possibility of a later explosion of the crisis.
  • Most likely:  Gradual attrition or stalemate.  This situation could affect Qatar long term and force it to respond partially to some demands.
  • Not likely to see a change by Saudi Arabia, UAE, or Bahrain.
  • Could be impacted by outcome of 2020 US elections.
  • Kuwait and Oman stated neutrality, but can exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and UAE.
  • Saudi Arabia and UAE could expand their hegemony to Kuwait and Oman. 
Also in the mix is how the Yemen, Libya, and Syrian conflicts affect the Gulf crisis?

Cinzia Bianco:  The European Union views this crisis as negative and "not helpful."

The EU:

  • Considers nuclear deal with Iran important and worries that Trump is putting it under remarkable stress, with encouragement from Saudi Arabia.
  • Is concerned about the fragmentation of the region, especially in Africa, Yemen, and Syria.
  • Views US as less trustworthy.
  • Is confused about the US commitment to the geopolitical balance in the region.
  • Is impacted more than the US by events in the Arab world.

The EU was created to enhance economic and social cooperation and ties to help prevent violent conflicts among European states.
  • The Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC) focused on enhanced economic cooperation, but did not prevent the Qatari crisis. 
    • Viewed by the EU as a blow to its own strategy.
The UK:

  • is dependent on the Gulf for 30 percent of its gas supply [check this].
  • Qatar, in turn, is a big investor in UK real estate and infrastructure.
  • Accordingly, the UK is in a difficult position.  It can not take the lead in resolution of the dispute.  It can not be seen as taking sides. 
  • In addition, the UK is focused on BREXIT.
France:
  • Maintains a strong relationship with all GCC countries.
  • President Macron has tried to "rebalance" the relationship.
  • But, he has no real capacity to force an end to the siege.
The EU may be forced to play a more active role if Saudi Arabia and the UAE try to impose their will on Kuwait and Oman.

Prof. Mohamed Si Bachir:  Third speaker to highlight how the blockade extended beyond diplomatic relations and government actors to the people of the Gulf, especially Qataris.

Several speakers, including this speaker, mentioned the "Iranian project" and the "Turkish project,"  which seem to refer to more aggressive foreign policies that extend the geopolitical influence of these countries.

This speaker expressed concerns that Gulf states had failed to build robust states and to create a social contract bringing dignity to the peoples of the region.  Instead, they created strategic partnerships with stronger countries from outside the region. These partnerships, however, are not necessarily helpful to the Arab world. 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pressured Oman and Kuwait for a harmonious regional policy.  Oman and Kuwait responded by declaring their neutrality in the dispute.  Both countries are closer to the policy of Qatar given their own national security reasons.  

quarta-feira, 2 de maio de 2018

The 12th Al Jazeera Forum: Opening Session









The Gulf, the Arabs, and the World Amid Current Developments



On April 28-29, 2018, Al Jazeera held its 12th Forum providing an opportunity for leading scholars and other experts to discuss a variety of topics affecting the Arab world.  The website for the forum, @aljazeeraform, provides additional information and links to the videos of each session.  You can follow the Twitter coverage at #AJForum.

I strongly recommend this event.  I attended all the sessions over two days.  (You will likely see me in some of the video shots.) 

Over several posts, I plan to summarize the presentations made at the conference.  I will be working from my notes, so I apologize in advance if I incorrectly paraphrase the remarks of any speaker.   I was also reliant on the quality of the translation services and their audibility.  Accordingly, I am happy to make any needed edits.

For summaries of the other sessions see:
Opening Session by Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, 
Chairman of the Board of Al Jazeera Media Network:  

The Gulf crisis reflects competition between countries and the intervention of foreign powers into Arab affairs.

The blockade has affected relations between Arab nations:

  • It has damaged the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
  • It has undermined trust in the GCC.
  • Simmering disputes are no longer confined to political leaders, but now affect people of the Gulf.
  • It has created a crisis of confidence among the people of the Gulf.
  • It undermines coordination among countries during a time of great transition in the region.
  • It has created a "deep rift" between GCC countries.
It is ironic that Korean leaders are meeting to resolve long standing tensions, but Gulf leaders are not meeting to resolve the tensions between them.

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